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Abstract Trust and reputation are central to effective interactions in open multi-agent sys-
tems (MAS) in which agents, that are owned by a variety of stakeholders, continuously enter
and leave the system. This openness means existing trust and reputation models cannot read-
ily be used since their performance suffers when there are various (unforseen) changes in
the environment. To this end, this paper presents FIRE, a trust and reputation model that
integrates a number of information sources to produce a comprehensive assessment of an
agent’slikelyperformanceinopensystems.Speciﬁcally,FIREincorporatesinteractiontrust,
role-based trust, witness reputation, and certiﬁed reputation to provide trust metrics in most
circumstances. FIRE is empirically evaluated and is shown to help agents gain better utility
(by effectively selecting appropriate interaction partners) than our benchmarks in a variety
of agent populations. It is also shown that FIRE is able to effectively respond to changes that
occur in an agent’s environment.
Keywords Trust · Reputation · Multi-agent systems
1. Introduction
A wide variety of networked computer systems (such as the Grid [11], the Semantic Web
[3], pervasive computing systems [28], and peer-to-peer systems [33]) can be viewed as
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multi-agent systems (MAS) in which the individual components act in an autonomous and
ﬂexible manner in order to achieve their objectives [16]. An important class of these systems
are those that are open; here deﬁned as systems in which agents can freely join and leave at
any time and where the agents are owned by various stakeholders with different aims and
objectives. From these two features, it can be assumed that in open MAS:
1. because of different ownership, the agents are likely to be self-interested and may be
unreliable;
2. no agent can know everything about its environment because in such environments it is
impossible or too costly to obtain such a global perspective; and
3. because of different ownership, no central authority can control all the agents.
Despite these many uncertainties, a key component of such systems is the interactions
that necessarily have to take place between the agents. Moreover, as the individuals only
have incomplete knowledge about their environment and their peers, trust plays a central
role in facilitating these interactions [12, 24]. Here, trust can be viewed as the expectation
or the belief that a party will act benignly and cooperatively with the trusting party [8, 12].
Evaluating this expectation before making interactions is important because it can help an
agent to estimate the trustworthiness of each potential partner and thus to decide whether the
partner is reliable enough to interact with. Speciﬁcally, trust is here deﬁned as the subjective
probability with which an agent a assesses that another agent b will perform a particular
action, both before a can monitor such action and in a context in which it affects its own
action(adaptedfrom[12]).Generallyspeaking,trustcanarisefromtwoviews:theindividual
and the societal. The former consists of agent a’s direct experiences from interactions with
agent b and the various relationships that may exist between them (e.g. owned by the same
organisation, relationships derived from links between the agents’ owners in real life such
as friendship or kinship, or relationships between a service provider agent and its registered
consumer agents). The latter consists of observations by a society of agent b’s past behaviour
(here termed its reputation) that are then made available to agents who themselves have not
interacted with b. These indirect observations are aggregated in some way to deﬁne agent
b’s past behaviour based on the experiences of participants in the system.
Given its importance, a number of computational models of trust and reputation have
been developed (see Section 2 for a more detailed review). However, as they stand, none of
them are well suited to open MAS. Typically, they are centralised models, designed with the
assumptionthattheyareacceptedandtrustedbyalltheindividualsthatjointhesystem.How-
ever, in an open MAS, agents (of various ownerships) may well question the trustworthiness
of a centralised reputation service and may not use it (see Property 2 below). On the other
hand, in order to work as intended, some of the current models require particular knowledge
that is, in general, not readily available. Given the above characteristics of an open MAS, a
trust model for such environments needs to possess the following properties:
1. It should take into account a variety of sources of trust information in order to have a
more robust trust measure (by cross correlating several perspectives) and to cope with
the situation that some of the sources may not be available.
2. Each agent should be able to evaluate trust for itself. Given the “no central authority”
nature of an open MAS, agents will typically be unwilling to rely solely on a single
centralised reputation service.
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To deal with these requirements, we have developed a new trust and reputation model
called FIRE1 (preliminary versions of which are described in [14,15]). In so doing, we
advance the state of the art in a number of ways. First, we have developed a modular model
that integrates four different types of trust and reputation:
– interaction trust resulting from past experience of direct interactions,
– role-based trust deﬁned by various role-based relationships between the agents,
– witness reputation built from reports of witnesses about an agent’s behaviour, and
– certiﬁed reputation built from third-party references provided by the agent itself.
This breadth is important in our domain because it enables an agent to combine a variety of
alternative sources of information (to cope with the inherent uncertainties) and because, in
variouscircumstances,notallofthesesourceswillbereadilyavailable(butameasureoftrust
is nevertheless needed to interact). Second, we empirically evaluate our model in a simulated
openMAS whereprovideragentsofferservicesofvariousquality levelstoconsumeragents.
Inthiscase,trustmodelsareusedbyconsumeragentstoselectgoodproviders(i.e.thosethat
yield high utility gain to their consumers) for interactions. In our evaluation, it is shown that
the integration of these sources of trust/reputation results in better performance of our model
(intermsofthelevelofutilitygainofagents)asagainstonlyusingoneortwoofthesesources.
Third, and of particular relevance, is the introduction of a novel type of reputation—certiﬁed
reputation.Theother,moretraditional,waysofbuildingatrustmeasure(i.e.interactiontrust,
role-based trust and witness reputation) have certain limitations. For example, if agent a has
not interacted with b before, it has no information to calculate its interaction trust. In the
case of witness reputation, a may not be able to ﬁnd relevant witness ratings about b,o rt h e
search process may take too long. Finally, there may be no role-base relationships with b.I f
all these things happen at the same time (e.g. agent a has just joined the environment), agent
a willnotbeabletoassessagentb’strustworthiness.Insuchsituations,ifagentb canpresent
certiﬁed information about its past performance to a (in the form of references from other
agents who have interacted with it), agent a will then be able to make some assessment of
its trustworthiness. Not only does the addition of certiﬁed reputation make our model more
applicable than without it, but our evaluation also shows that it signiﬁcantly increases our
model’s robustness.
Theremainderofthepaperisorganisedasfollows.Inthenextsection,wereviewanumber
oftrust/reputationmodelsagainstourrequirementsfortrustmodelsinopenMAS.InSection
3 we present the FIRE model and its components. Then the testbed and the methodology
described in Section 4 will be used to empirically evaluate the model in Section 5. Finally,
Section 6 concludes this paper and outlines future work.
2. Related work
A wide variety of trust and reputation models have been developed in the last few years
(e.g. [1], [4] [5], [17], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [26], [30], [31], [34], [38], [40]). This
section reviews a selection of notable models and shows how computational trust models
have evolved in recent years with a particular emphasis on their applicability in open MAS
(see[24]foramorecompletereview).Speciﬁcally,wedivideourdiscussionintothreeareas.
First, Section 2.1 presents mechanisms that derive trust using certiﬁcates, rules, and policies.
Second, Section 2.2 surveys the popular trust models that follow the centralised approach in
1 FIRE is from “ﬁdes” (Latin for “trust”) and “reputation”. In the Ramayana legend of India, Sita proved the
purity of her character by passing through the raging ﬂames.122 Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 13: 119–154
which witness observations are reported to a central authority. Finally, Section 2.3 presents
notablemodelsthatfollowthedecentralisedapproachinwhichnocentralauthorityisneeded
for trust evaluations. From now on, for the convenience in referring agents, we call the agent
evaluating the trustworthiness of another the evaluator, or agent a; and the agent being
evaluated by a the target agent, or agent b.
2.1. Trust policy management
Ingeneral,securitysystemsaredesignedtoprotectresourcesfromharmfulaccesses.Theydo
so by restricting access to the resources to authorised users only. After having been authen-
ticated by the system (e.g. logging in), an authorised user is granted a clearly deﬁned set of
rights,whichallowsittoaccessacertainsetofresources[13].Intraditionalsecuritysystems,
the set of rights for each user is set manually by system administrators and, therefore, which
user and how much it is trusted is determined by them. In order to automate this process,
several trust policy management systems have been developed (such as PolicyMaker [13],
Trust-Serv [32], and KAoS [35]). In these systems, an agent or user may present information
to seek the trust of the system. An agent/user is granted rights based on its certiﬁcates of
its identity according to predeﬁned policies (i.e. rules such as “if a is a registered user and
it possesses a valid credit card then it can book ﬂights”). These systems regard an agent as
trusted when it can present sufﬁcient certiﬁcates about its identity. This is called access trust
[13] since the agent is trusted to access the system’s resources. However, the situation is
reversed in MAS. A typical scenario in MAS is that an agent usually needs to use services
provided by others to achieve its goals. It frequently has to decide on which agents’ services
itshouldrely.Insuchsituations,itdoesnotneedtoprotectitselffromunauthorisedaccesses,
but, rather, needs to protect itself from relying on unreliable service providers. In security or
trust policy management systems, the certiﬁcates an agent presents cannot provide further
informationonwhetheritwillactinatrustworthy/reliablemanner.Therefore,inscenariosin
which an agent needs to protect itself from unreliable providers, such systems are not useful.
In this respect, Maximilien and Singh introduce the concept of endorsements [21]—
certiﬁcates endorsing that a service (provider) is trusted and preferred by their issuers. How-
ever,suchendorsementscanonlyletanagentknowthattheservicemaybetrustedbecauseit
ispreferredbyotheragents.Thisinformationistypicallysomewhatvagueanddoesnotreveal
the expected or achievable performance of that service. Moreover, a service provider may
serve different consumers differently. Therefore, endorsements have little utility in identify-
ing unreliable providers. Although endorsements may appear somewhat similar to certiﬁed
reputation, they are different. Certiﬁed reputation are references valuing how good an agent
iswithrespecttoanaspectofitsservice.Therefore,certiﬁedreputationprovidesmoreuseful
information for estimating an agent’s performance than endorsements. The idea of certiﬁed
reputationisalsosimilartotheRCertPXprotocol[23]instoringratingsattheratee.However,
the work in [23] does not provide a trust model based on these ratings, but focuses instead on
designing a sophisticated protocol for peer-to-peer systems that ensures ratings are protected
from tampering and can be veriﬁed through communication with the raters.
Certiﬁcates are also used by Mass and Shehory [20] for trust establishment in open MAS.
In their system, an agent presents certiﬁcates about itself given by third-parties to gain the
trustofanotheragent.Thecontentofsuchcertiﬁcatescanbefreelydeﬁnedtocertifyvirtually
anyfacts(e.g.“agentXwasdevelopedbyIBM”,“agentXhasagoodservicequality”,“agent
X is recommended with a recommendation value 9”). Having been presented with a set of
such certiﬁcates, an agent uses rules to assign the certiﬁed agent to predeﬁned roles (with
predeﬁned trust levels) based on these certiﬁcates. In contrast, certiﬁcates in our approachAuton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 13: 119–154 123
provide quantiﬁed information about an agent’s past performance which are used to compu-
tationally estimate that agent’s future performance and then the estimated performance will
determine the trustworthiness of that agent.
2.2. Centralised reputation mechanisms
Reputation mechanisms have been widely used in online electronic commerce systems (e.g.
eBay,Amazon)whichtypicallymanagethereputationofallitsusersinacentralisedmanner.
ThissectionsurveysthereputationmodelofEBayandSPORAS,whicharethemostpopular
in this approach.
2.2.1. EBay reputation model
Since traditional security mechanisms cannot protect an agent from unreliable service pro-
viders, novel models have been developed to model service provision trust—the trust that
a service provider is competent and will provide a service in a reliable manner [13]. The
main building block of these models is information about an agent’s past behaviours. This
informationisusedtodeducethetrustworthinessofthatagentintermsofitscompetencyand
reliability. Online reputation mechanisms (e.g. those on eBay [10, 25] and Amazon Auctions
[2]) are probably the most widely used such models. They are implemented as a centralised
rating system so that their users can report about the behaviour of one another in past trans-
actions via rating and leaving textual comments. In so doing, users in their communities
can learn about the past behaviour of a given user to decide whether it is trustworthy to do
businesswith.Forexample,aneBayuser,afteraninteraction,canrateitspartneronthescale
of −1, 0, or +1, which means positive, neutral and negative rating respectively. The ratings
are stored centrally and the reputation value is computed as the sum of those ratings over
six months. Thus, reputation in these models is a global single value representing a user’s
overall trustworthiness. However, this is too simple for applications in MAS since they only
consider the trustworthiness of an agent as one dimension.2 Since the ratings are aggregated
equally,themechanismcannotadaptwelltochangesinauser’sperformance(e.g.ausermay
cheat in a few interactions after obtaining a high reputation value, but still retains a positive
reputation).
In summary, the reputation values in these systems contain very little information, and
usersofthesesystemsneedtolookfortextualcommentsprovidingmoreinformation.There-
fore,suchmechanismsarenotwellsuitedtocomputationalagents,whichmustusuallymake
decisions autonomously. In addition, since there is no central authority that can control all
the agents in an open MAS, an agent may well question the credibility of those centralised
reputation models and decide not to use them.
2.2.2. SPORAS
SPORAS [40] extends the online reputation models mentioned above by introducing a new
method for rating aggregation. Speciﬁcally, instead of storing all the ratings, each time a rat-
2 Decisions associated with task delegationinMASusually involveconsideringnumerousfactors. Therefore,
asingleoveralltrustworthinessvalueislikelybetooabstracttobeusedtodifferentiatebetweensimilarservice
providers. For example, a news provider who may not always provide the latest news ﬁrst, but always has
correct news, may or may not be preferable over the one who can have all the latest news but cannot guarantee
its accuracy.124 Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 13: 119–154
ing is received it updates the reputation of the involved party using an algorithm that satisﬁes
the following principles:
1. New users start with a minimum reputation value and they build up reputation during
their activity on the system.
2. The reputation value of a user never falls below the reputation of a new user.
3. After each transaction, the reputation values of the involved users are updated according
to the feedback provided by other parties, which reﬂect their trustworthiness in the latest
transaction.
4. Users with very high reputation values experience much smaller rating changes after
each update.
5. Ratings must be discounted over time so that the most recent ratings have more weight
in the evaluation of a users’s reputation.
Ingeneral,SPORASisacentralisedreputationmodelwithmoresophisticatedcharacteristics
to model the trust dynamics than the simple models in the previous section. For example,
Principles 1 and 2 above are to prevent a user with a bad reputation leaving the community
and entering with a fresh reputation (since the reputation of a new user is the lowest repu-
tation possible). However, at the same time, this penalises newcomers and may discourage
them from participating in the community. In addition, SPORAS also introduces a reliability
measure based on the deviation of rating values. This is an indication of the predictive power
of SPORAS for that user’s reputation. For instance, a high deviation value can mean either
that the user has not been active enough to be able to generate a more accurate prediction
for his/her reputation, or that the user’s behaviour has a high degree of variation. Hence,
each user has a reputation value and a reliability value globally available to other users. In
SPORAS, the reputation value of a user and its reliability are discounted over time as a new
rating is received. Therefore, SPORAS can adapt to changes in a user’s behaviour according
to the latest rating.
In summary, SPORAS provides a trust measure that has more desirable features than that
of similar online models such as eBay’s, or Amazon’s. However, as discussed in the previous
section, its centralised design is not suitable for applications in an open MAS. Moreover, as
shown by our experiments in Section 5, SPORAS is very susceptible to rating noise resulted
from agents’ subjective views that are commonplace in open MAS.
2.3. Decentralised trust models
As more and more computational systems of all kinds move toward large-scale, open and
dynamic architectures, more and more trust models are designed such that each agent can
carry out trust evaluation themselves without a central trust authority. This section surveys
several models that follow this approach.
2.3.1. Jurca and Faltings
Jurca and Faltings [17] introduce a reputation mechanism where agents are incentivised to
report truthfully about their interactions’ results. They deﬁne a set of broker agents (called
R-agents) whose tasks are buying and aggregating reports from other agents and selling back
reputationinformationtothemwhentheyneedit.Allreportsaboutanagentaresimplyaggre-
gatedusingtheaveragingmethodtoproducethereputationvalueforthatagent.Althoughthe
R-agentsaredistributedinthesystem,eachofthemcollectsandaggregatesreputationreports
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above (i.e. the questionable objectiveness of R-agents in open MAS). In order to incentivise
agents to share their reports truthfully, Jurca and Faltings propose a payment scheme for
reputation reports. This scheme guarantees that agents who report incorrectly will gradually
lose money (during the process of selling reports and buying reputation information), while
honest agents will not. Therefore, this mechanism makes it rational for an agent to report its
observations honestly and this is the main contribution of their work. However, reputation
reports are limited to the values 0 and 1 (0 for cheating agents and 1 for cooperating agents
in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma environment [7]), and the rational property may not hold
if an application requires reports represented by more than these particular values (e.g. 0.1,
0.75).
2.3.2. Regret
Regret [27, 26] is a reputation model in which the trust evaluation process is completely
decentralised. Employing Regret, each agent is able to evaluate the reputation of others by
itself. In order to do so, each agent rates its partner’s performance after every interaction and
records its ratings in a local database. The relevant ratings will be queried from this database
when trust evaluation is needed. The trust value derived from those ratings is termed direct
trust and is calculated as the weighed means of all ratings. Each rating is weighed according
to its recency. Intuitively, a more recent rating is deemed to be more current and is weighted
morethanthosethatarelessrecent.However,themethodRegretusestocalculatetheweights
for each rating has a shortcoming regarding time granularity control and does not actually
reﬂect a rating’s recency (see Appendix A.) Like SPORAS, Regret also provides a reliability
value for each trust value to represent its predictive power. The reliability value is calculated
fromtworeliabilitymeasures:thenumberofratingstakenintoaccountinproducingthetrust
values and the deviation of these ratings.
In addition, agents are assumed to be willing to share their opinions about one another.
Based on this, Regret develops a witness reputation component along with a sophisticated
methodforaggregatingwitnessreportstakingintoaccountthepossibilityofdishonestreports.
The operation of this component depends on the social network3 built up by each agent.
In particular, Regret uses the social network to ﬁnd witnesses, to decide which witnesses
will be consulted, and how to weight those witnesses’ opinions. However, Regret does not
specify how such social networks are to be built, and, thus, this component is of limited
use.
Besides direct trust and witness reputation, Regret also introduces the concepts of neigh-
bourhood reputation and system reputation. The former is calculated from the reputation
of the target’s neighbour agents based on fuzzy rules. However, this again requires a social
network to work. The system reputation is a mechanism to assign default trust values to the
target agent based on its social role in an interaction (e.g. buyer, seller). However, this is only
useful if additional domain-speciﬁc information is available.
In summary, the decentralising approach of Regret allows agents to evaluate trust by
themselves without relying on a centralised mechanism. It also takes various sources of
trust information into account and consider the possibility of disinformation. Therefore, the
approach Regret adopts is compatible with the requirements for a trust model in open MAS.
However,apartfromthedirecttrustcomponent,therestofthemodelisnotreadilyapplicable.
3 A social network is a graph whose nodes represent agents in a society and whose edges represent social
relationships between them (see [36] for more detail). It can be viewed as an agent’s (limited) knowledge
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The main reason is that Regret does not show how each agent can build the social network
on which Regret heavily depends.
2.3.3. Referral System
Inbuildingareputationsystembasedonwitnessinformation,YuandSingh[38,39]developa
mechanism to locate information sources (i.e. witnesses) based on individual agents’ knowl-
edgeandhelp(througheachagent’scontacts)withoutrelyingonacentralisedservice.Hence,
this approach is well suited for applications in an open MAS which is distributed by nature.
In particular, in this system, agents cooperate by giving, pursuing, and evaluating referrals
(a recommendation to contact another agent). Each agent in the system maintains a list of
acquaintances (other agents that it knows) and their expertise. Thus, when looking for a
certain piece of information, an agent can send the query to a number of its acquaintances
who will try to answer the query if possible or, if they cannot, they will send back referrals
pointing to other agents that they believe are likely to have the desired information (based on
those agent’s expertise). Yu and Singh’s referral system uses a vector space model (VSM)
[29] to model agents’ expertise. An agent’s expertise is then used to determine how likely it
is to have interaction with or to know witnesses of the target agent.
2.3.4. TRAVOS
TRAVOS[34]isatrustmodelthatisbuiltuponprobabilitytheoryandbasedonobservations
of past interaction between agents. In this model, the outcome of an interaction is simpliﬁed
intoabinaryrating(i.e.1forasuccessfulinteraction,0 foraunsuccessfulone).Usingbinary
ratingsallowsTRAVOStomakeuseofthebetafamilyofprobabilitydensityfunctions(PDF)
[9] to model the probability of having a successful interaction with a particular given agent.
This probability is then used as that agent’s trust value. In addition, using PDFs, TRAVOS
also calculates the conﬁdence of its trust values given an acceptable level of error. If the
conﬁdence level of a trust value is below a predetermined minimum level, TRAVOS will
seek witness information about the target agent’s past performance. Witness information is
shared in the form of frequencies of successful and unsuccessful interactions that the witness
has had with the target agent. After interacting with the target agent itself, the evaluator
compares the received witness report with its own observations. By this means, the evaluator
calculates the probability that the witness’s information supports the true behaviour of the
targetagentwithinareasonablemarginoferror,andusesthisprobabilitytoweighttheimpact
of the witness’ opinions on future decisions made be the evaluator. However, as discussed in
Section 2.2, TRAVOS’s simpliﬁed representation of interaction ratings is rather limited and
not suitable for a wide range of applications in open MAS.
3. The FIRE model
This section presents our model of trust and reputation for applications in open MAS. First,
we present the sources of trust information that FIRE uses for trust evaluation (Section 3.1).
Then Section 3.2 shows how a trust value is calculated. The individual components of FIRE
are subsequently described in Sections 3.3–3.6. Finally, Section 3.7 describes how an overall
trust value is produced by combining these components.Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 13: 119–154 127
3.1. Sources of trust information
Ascanbeseenintheprevioussection,trustcancomefromanumberofinformationsources:
direct experience, witness information, rules or policies. However, due to the openness of
a MAS, the level of knowledge of an agent about its environment and its peers may vary
greatly during its life cycle. Therefore, at any given time, some information sources may
not be available, or adequate, for deducing trust. For example, the following situations may
(independently) happen:
– An agent may never have interacted with a given target agent and, hence, its experience
cannot be used to deduce how trustworthy the target agent is.
– An agent may not be able to locate a witness for the target agent (because of a lack
of knowledge about the target agent’s society) and, therefore, it cannot obtain witness
information about that agent’s behaviours.
– The current set of rules to determine the level of trust is not applicable for the target
agent.
In such scenarios, trust models that use only one source of information will fail to provide
a trust value of the target agent. For that reason, FIRE adopts a broader base of information
than has hitherto been used for providing trust-related information. Although the number
of sources that provide trust-related information can be greatly varied from application to
application, we consider that most of them can be categorised into the four main sources as
follows:
– Direct experience: The evaluator uses its previous experiences in interacting with the
target agenttodetermineits trustworthiness. Thistypeoftrust iscalledInteractionTrust.
– Witness information: Assuming that agents are willing to share their direct experiences,
the evaluator can collect experiences of other agents that interacted with the target agent.
Such information will be used to derive the trustworthiness of the target agent based on
the views of its witnesses. Hence this type of trust is called Witness Reputation.
– Role-based rules: Besides an agent’s past behaviours (which is used in the two previous
types of trust), there are certain types of information that can be used to deduce trust.
These can be the various relationships between the evaluator and the target agent or its
knowledge about its domain (e.g. norms, or the legal system in effect). For example, an
agent may be preset to trust any other agent that is owned, or certiﬁed, by its owner;
it may trust that any authorised dealer will sell products complying to their company’s
standards; or it may trust another agent if it is a member of a trustworthy group.4 Such
settings or beliefs (which are mostly domain-speciﬁc) can be captured by rules based on
the roles of the evaluator and the target agent to assign a predetermined trustworthiness
to the target agent. Hence this type of trust is called Role-based Trust.
– Third-party references provided by the target agents: In the previous cases, the evaluator
needstocollecttherequiredinformationitself.However,thetargetagentcanalsoactively
seek the trust of the evaluator by presenting arguments about its trustworthiness. In this
paper, such arguments are references produced by the agents that have interacted with
the target agents certifying its behaviours.5 However, in contrast to witness information
4 This belief is similar to the neighbourhood reputation in Regret, which calculates the reputation of an agent
from the reputation of the agents that it is connected to.
5 Theargumentscanalsobethetargetagent’sidentity,itscertiﬁcations(e.g.“authoriseddealer”,performance
awards),itssourcesofproducts(toguaranteetheirquality),andsoon.However,deducingtrust(ortheexpected
performance) of the target agent from such information requires knowledge about the application domain.128 Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 13: 119–154
which needs to be collected by the evaluator, the target agent stores and provides such
certiﬁed references on request to gain the trust of the evaluator. Those references can be
obtained by the target agent (assuming the cooperation of its partners) from only a few
interactions, thus, they are usually readily available. This type of trust is called Certiﬁed
Reputation.
FIRE integrates all four sources of information and is able to provide trust metrics in
a wide variety of situations. Certiﬁed Reputation, in particular, greatly enhances FIRE in
this respect since the evaluator does not have to obtain this type of information itself (as
is the case with other types of trust). Hence, the addition of certiﬁed reputation decreases
the possibility that the evaluator fails to evaluate the trustworthiness of the target agent due
to a lack of information. Our hypothesis is that integrating these various sources will also
enhance the precision of the trust model. This will be veriﬁed subsequently in our empirical
evaluation. Here, each type of trust information is processed by a particular component of
FIRE: interaction trust (IT), witness reputation (WR), role-based trust (RT), and certiﬁed
reputation (CR) components.
It should be noted that the WR and CR components depend on third-party information
(witness experiences and references) and, therefore, they are susceptible to any inaccuracy
of such information. Since agents in an open MAS are self-interested, they may provide
false ratings to gain unwarranted trust for their partners. However, in this paper, we have
not considered the problem of lying and inaccuracy. Therefore, we currently assume that all
agents are honest in exchanging information. Although this is unrealistic for an open MAS,
our aim now is to ascertain that our philosophy and trust components are actually effective.
The problem of various sorts of disinformation in reporting ratings will be considered in
future work.
In addition to the characteristics of an open MAS, we have made a number of assump-
tionsabouttheagentsandtheirenvironment.BeforegoingontodiscussFIRE,westatethese
assumptions:
Assumption 1. Agents are willing to share their experiences with others (as witnesses or as
referees).
Assumption 2. Agents are honest in exchanging information with one another.
In FIRE, except the RT component, which deduces trust based on rules, the other com-
ponents deduce trust from information about the target agent’s behaviour. We use ratings to
capturethistypeofinformation.Here,aratingistheevaluationaboutanagent’sperformance
given by its partner in an interaction between them. For instance, consider an example where
agent a subscribes to a news service provided by agent b. Each time a receives a piece of
news from b, it can evaluate the news provided in terms of topicality, quality, and honesty.
From its evaluation, agent a may give ratings about agent b’s service in those terms for that
particularinteraction.Ratingsarethustuplesinthefollowingform:r = (a,b,c,i,v),where
a and b are the agents that participated in the interaction i,a n dv is the rating value a gave b
for the term c (e.g. topicality, quality, honesty). The range of v is [−1,+1],w h e r e−1 means
absolutely negative, +1 means absolutely positive, and 0 means neutral.
Each time agent a gives a rating, it will be stored in the agent’s local rating database.
Ratings in this database will be retrieved when needed for trust evaluation or for sharing with
This is dealt with in Role-based Trust based on rules encoding an agent’s beliefs. Therefore, we only consider
third-party references here because they can be quantiﬁed and computationally aggregated in a standardised
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other agents. However, an agent does not need to store all ratings it makes. As the environ-
ment of an open MAS is dynamic, old ratings usually become out-of-date due to changes
in the environment. In addition, since each agent has limited resource (i.e. memory), storing
all ratings about various agents is not necessarily an option. Therefore, each agent will only
store at maximum the H latest ratings given to another agent. Here H is called the rating
history size. This parameter is adjustable according to a particular agent’s situation.
3.2. Trust formula
In order to calculate the trust value of a target agent, the components of FIRE will have to
collectrelevantratingsaboutthatagent’spastbehaviour.Thesubsequentsectionswill deﬁne
how and which ratings are collected by each component. This section describes how the set
of ratings each component collects is used to estimate the target agent’s future behaviour, or
more speciﬁcally, the expected rating value that agent is likely to receive in a future inter-
action. It is also viewed as the target agent’s trust value. A common way to estimate that
value is to calculate it as the arithmetic mean of all the rating values in the set. However,
these ratings are usually not equally relevant when estimating the expected rating value. For
example,someratingsmaybeolderthanothersand,thus,aredeemedtobeout-of-date;some
may come from a more reliable source that suggests a higher level of credibility compared
to others. Therefore, we devise a rating weight function ωK for each component of FIRE6
which calculates the relevance of each given rating. K is thus one of I, R, W,a n dC standing
forinteractiontrust,role-basedtrust,witnessreputation,andcertiﬁedreputationrespectively.
Then instead of considering all ratings equally, the trust value is calculated as the weighted
mean of all the ratings available7, whose weights are given by the corresponding weight
function:
TK(a,b,c) =

ri∈RK(a,b,c) ωK(ri) · vi

ri∈RK(a,b,c) ωK(ri)
(1)
where TK(a,b,c) is the trust value that agent a has in agent b with respect to term c,w h i c h
is calculated by the component K; RK(a,b,c) is the set of ratings collected by component K
for calculating TK(a,b,c); ωK(ri) is the rating weight function that calculates the relevance
or the reliability of the rating ri (ωK(ri) ≥ 0); and vi is the value of the rating ri. In short,
the trust value is calculated as the sum of all the available ratings weighted by the rating
relevance and normalised to the range of [−1,1] (by dividing the sum by the sum of all the
weights). The rating weight function ωK(ri) is later deﬁned for each component.
As we have discussed, the trust value given above lets an agent know the expected per-
formance of the target agent. However, the trust value alone is not enough. For example, a
trust value of +1 calculated from only 1 rating or from 10 ratings may have different effects
on an agent’s decision. Therefore, an agent usually also needs to know how likely it is that
the target agent will perform at that expected performance (similar to the expected value
and deviation measures in statistics). In other words, apart from the trust value, its reliability
should also be provided by a trust model. Here, we deﬁne a reliability measure that reﬂects
the conﬁdence of the trust model in producing each trust value given the data it took into
account. This is given in the form of a reliability value that ranges in [0,1], where 0 is for
6 SinceeachcomponentofFIREcollectsratingsfromadifferentsource,italsoneedsadifferentwaytocalcu-
late the relevancy of ratings. For example, the WR component may have information about witness credibility
to take into account when weighing ratings, while this information is not relevant to the IT or RT components.
7 We choose the weighted mean method here because it allows us to take the relevance of each rating into
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complete uncertainty and 1 for total conﬁdence. The reliability value is given based on the
two following measures:
– Rating reliability: Since the rating weight function ωK gives us the relevancy — in other
words, the quality or the reliability — of each rating taken into account, the sum of all
rating weights reﬂects the reliability of the rating set taken into account in computing
TK(a,b,c) in (1) above. Therefore, we devise a rating reliability measure based on this
sum:
ρRK (a,b,c) = 1 − e
−γK·

ri∈RK(a,b,c) ωK(ri)

(2)
where ρRK(a,b,c) is the reliability value of the rating set RK(a,b,c), γK is a parameter
used to adjust the slope of the reliability function to suit the rating weight function of
each component (see Fig. 1). Since each component has its own rating weight function,
it also has a rating reliability function of its own—ρRK. As above, K is one of I, R, W,
and C. R in ρRK stands for “rating reliability”. Intuitively, the rating reliability should
increase proportionally to the sum of the rating weights. However, since this sum is not
limited, we choose the (increasing) function 1−e−x in order that the resulted reliability
value is limited in [0,1]. This normalisation is required because the trust and reliability
values of FIRE’s components will be combined later on in Section 3.7. Moreover, since
each rating weight function is deﬁned differently and may have an inconsistent range
compared to one another’s, the parameter γK is introduced in order to adjust the rate of
the rating reliability in (2) according to each rating weight function’s range. In sum, the
rating reliability function ρRK (a,b,c) gradually increases from 0 (the lowest reliability)
to 1 (the highest reliability) when the sum of rating weights increases from 0 to +∞.
– Deviation reliability: The greater the variability in the rating values, the more volatile
the other agent is likely to be in fulﬁlling its agreements. Therefore, the deviation in the
ratings’ values is also a metric that reﬂects a trust value’s reliability:
ρDK(a,b,c) = 1 −
1
2
·

ri∈RK(a,b,c) ωK(ri) ·| vi − TK(a,b,c)|

ri∈RK(a,b,c) ωK(ri)
, (3)
where ρDK(a,b,c) is the deviation reliability value of the trust value TK(a,b,c). Here,
D in ρDK stands for “deviation”. Basically, (3) calculates the deviation of ratings’ values
in the set of ratings RK(a,b,c) around the “expected” value (i.e. the trust value); the
calculated deviation is then normalised to [0,1]. Intuitively, when there is no deviation in
the rating’s value (i.e. the target agent performs consistently), the deviation reliability is
1 (i.e. the most reliable); and it decreases proportionally to 0 (i.e. the least reliable) when
the deviation increases.
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In order to take both of these reliability factors above into account, the reliability value of
the produced trust value, denoted by ρK(a,b,c), is deﬁned as the combination of the rating
and the deviation reliabilities:
ρK(a,b,c) = ρRK(a,b,c) · ρDK(a,b,c) (4)
3.3. Interaction trust
As introduced in Section 3.1, interaction trust is built from the direct experience of an agent.
It models the trust that ensues from the direct interactions between two agents. Here we
simply exploit the direct trust component of Regret (see Section 2.3) since this meets all our
requirementsfordealingwithdirectexperiences.Inmoredetail,eachagentratesitspartner’s
performance after every transaction and stores its ratings in a local rating database. When
calculating the IT value for agent b with respect to term c, agent a has to query its database
for all the ratings that have the form (a,b,c,_,_), where the “_” symbol can be replaced by
any value. We call the set of those ratings RI(a,b,c).
Since older ratings may become out-of-date quickly, we use the recency of the ratings
as a rating weight function to give recent, and likely more updated, ratings more weights
than older ratings in IT evaluation. However, as pointed out in Section 2.3, Regret’s method
of calculating rating recency has several unfavourable aspects. Therefore, we devise a new
ratingrecencyfunctionbasedonthetimedifferencebetweencurrenttimeandtheratingtime
as this metrics reﬂects precisely how old (i.e. how recent) a rating is. In order to make our
rating recency function adjustable to suit the time granularity in different applications, the
parameter λ, called the recency scaling factor, is introduced in the function (to scale time
values). Our rating recency function, which is also used as the rating weight function for IT,
is given by the following formula:
ωI(ri) = e−
 t(ri)
λ (5)
whereωI(ri)istheweightfortheratingri (usedin(1)), t(ri)isthetimedifferencebetween
the current time and the time when the rating ri is recorded. In our model, analogously to
human perception, we view the time difference of two recent events as more signiﬁcant than
the same one of two older events (see Appendix A for an example). Hence, the exponential
function above is chosen for rating recency because its shape over time ﬁts our view on how
the recency of ratings should affect an agent’s decision about trust (see Fig. 2). Our intuition
is that new ratings are deemed to reﬂect the target agent’s current performance more appro-
priately than old ratings, and our recency function here is to help FIRE adapt quickly to any
changes in that agent’s performance. In (5), the parameter λ is hand-picked for a particular
application depending on the time unit used. For instance, if the time unit used is day and we
want a rating obtained ﬁve days earlier to only have half the effect of a new rating obtained
today (i.e. rating weights of 0.5 and 1, respectively;  t(ri) = 5) then λ =− 5
ln(0.5).
Given the rating set RI(a,b,c) and the rating weight function ωI(ri) as speciﬁed above,
the IT value TI(a,b,c) and its reliability ρI(a,b,c) are calculated as deﬁned in (1) and (4)
(Section 3.2).
3.4. Role-based trust
Role-based trust models the trust resulting from the role-based relationships between two
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friendship relationship between their owners). Since there is no general method for com-
putationally quantifying trust based on this type of relationship, we use rules to assign RT
values. As previously discussed, those rules are used to encode knowledge about the trust
dynamics in the application domain. Therefore, they are usually domain-speciﬁc and must
be speciﬁed by an agent’s designer or its owner. In other words, this component provides the
means of adapting FIRE to a particular environment and, thus, making it perform better in
that environment. Here, rules are tuples of the following form: rul = (rolea,roleb,c,e,v),
which describes a rule that if rolea and roleb are the roles of agent a and b, respectively,
then the expected performance of b with respect to the term c in an interaction with a is v
(v ∈[ − 1,1]); e ∈[ 0,1] is the level of inﬂuence of this rule on the resulting RT value or the
belief strength of agent a on the rule. For example, possible rules may be:
rul1 = (buyer,seller,quality,0.3,−0.2),
rul2 = (_,government-seller,quality,0.8,0.0),
rul3 = (_,team-mate,honesty,1.0,1.0).
Here rul1 expresses an agent’s belief that an ordinary seller will usually sell a product of
slightly lower quality than agreed, but the reliability of this belief is low (0.3); rul2 expresses
a stronger belief that an agent can expect a governmental seller to do what is agreed in terms
of product quality; rul3 tells an agent to expect total honesty from its team mate (e.g. agents
of the same owner). Here, rul1 and rul2 encode norms of the environment, while rul3 is
the belief based on an arrangement between agents. Such rules are given to the agent by its
owner. Additional rules can naturally be added during an agent’s life cycle.
Each agent has its own set of rules which are stored in a (local) rule database. In order to
determine the RT of agent b with respect to term c, agent a looks up the relevant rules from
its rule database. We call the set of those rules RR(a,b,c). Since the form of a rule is very
analogous to that of a rating, the general trust formula in (1) can be used to calculate the RT
of b, which is denoted by TR(a,b,c), from this set. Here, the level of inﬂuence of each rule
is used as the weight for that rule: ωR(ri) = ei. Therefore, it should be noted that in case
there exist conﬂicts in the applicable rules (i.e. contradicting expected performance values),
all these rules will be taken into account but the deviation measure reliability (ρDK)o ft h e
resultedtrustvaluewillbelow(becauseofthehighdeviationoftherulesused).This,inturn,
will result in a low reliability of the RT trust value, which shows that the RT trust value has
a low predictive power and so it will be weighted accordingly in calculating the overall trust
value (see Section 3.7).
3.5. Witness reputation
The witness reputation of a target agent b is built on observations about its behaviour by
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witnesses that have interacted with b. Here, it is assumed that agents in open MAS are
willing to share ratings that they made and to help others search witnesses. In order to ﬁnd
relevant witnesses, we implement a variant of Yu and Singh’s referral system (Section 2.3)
without using the VSM model for modelling expertise.8 Instead, our system assumes that
eachagenthasameasureofthedegreeoflikelinesswithwhichanagentcanfulﬁlaninforma-
tion query about witness information and witness locating. This measure needs to be deﬁned
in an application speciﬁc manner. For example, in our testbed (described in Section 4.1), an
agent is assumed to know local agents (those that are near to it) better and, therefore, we use
the distance between an acquaintance and the target agent as the knowledge measure. Thus
the nearer to the target agent, the more likely the acquaintance is to know it. This measure
is used in the referral process to help locate witnesses. However, it should be noted that the
resourcesavailabletoeachagentarelimited(intermsofitsmemory,itscommunicationcost,
or some other measure) and the evaluator (agent a) usually has limited time for trust evalua-
tion(beforeithastoinitiateaninteraction).Thus,theprocessoflocatingwitnessesshouldbe
limited according to an agent’s time constraints, though this may result in no witnesses being
located (even though appropriate agents are available in the system). Here, the parameters
nBF (called the branching factor [39]) and nRL (called the referral length threshold,o rt h e
depth of referral graphs in [39]) are introduced for that purpose. Speciﬁcally, nBF is used to
limit the number of acquaintances to which a query is forwarded, and nRL to limit the length
of referral chains. Besides restricting the search range of agent a due to time constraints, the
referrallengththresholdalsohelpsanagentnottowasteitseffortqueryingagentsthataretoo
distant because the further the witness is from a (in terms of the length of the referral chain
to the witness from a), the less reliable or relevant its information. At present, nBF and nRL
need to be hand-picked according to an agent’s resources constraints and its environment’s
acquaintance networks.
Speciﬁcally, the process of evaluating WR is as follows:
1. Whenagenta assessestheWRofagentb withrespecttotermc,denotedby TW(a,b,c),
it sends out a query for ratings of the form (_,b,c,_,_) to nBF acquaintances that are
likely to have relevant ratings on agent b and term c (see Fig. 3, where nBF = 2).
2. These acquaintances, upon receiving the query, try to match it to their own (local) rating
databases. If they ﬁnd matching ratings, it means they have had interactions with b,a n d
they will return the ratings found to a.
3. If they cannot ﬁnd the requested information, they will return referrals identifying their
nBF acquaintances that they believe are most likely to have the relevant ratings to the
query (based on the knowledge measure) so that a can look further.
4. Thisprocesscontinuesuntila ﬁndssufﬁcientwitnessesorthelengthofitsreferralchains
reach the deﬁned threshold nRL.
It should be noted here that in this process we implicitly assume that agents in a’s refer-
ral network are willing to help a ﬁnding the required witness ratings. This is not a trivial
assumption and needs to be guaranteed for this referral process (as for any mechanism based
onthird-partyinformation)towork,especiallyinopenMASwhereagentsareself-interested.
However, we do not consider how such a guarantee can be obtained in this paper because
that task would very much depend on the particular application domain being considered.
Thus, end-users who wish to make use of WR need to provide necessary measures for this
8 As pointed out in [37], the VSM model does not support hierarchy in expertise types, which can be better
represented by service graphs. In this respect (i.e. modelling expertise), there is no universal model for all
applications.Therefore,weleavethechoiceofexpertisemodeltoendusersastheycanevaluatewhichmethod
is best suited to their particular applications.134 Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 13: 119–154
Fig. 3 Referral process
willingness assumption to hold (e.g. obtaining an agreement between agents on sharing wit-
ness information or paying for any information request).
Thesetofratingscollectedfromthereferralprocess,denotedbyRW(a,b,c),isthenused
to calculate the WR of agent b (i.e. TW(a,b,c)) following (1). Here, the rating weight func-
tion for WR, ωW(ri), is intended to reﬂect the quality of a witness rating which also includes
the rating’s credibility (since in realistic environments agents may give false or inaccurate
ratings). However, as we currently assume all agents are honest, only the recency of ratings
is used as per Section 3.3 (i.e. ωW(ri) = ωI(ri), see (5)). A model of witness credibility will
be developed and incorporated into FIRE in future work.
3.6. Certiﬁed reputation
Certiﬁed reputation of a target agent b consists of a number of certiﬁed references9 about
its behaviour on particular tasks that are provided by third-party agents. Such information
is obtained and stored by the target agent itself and is then made available to any other
agent that wishes to evaluate its trustworthiness for further interactions (somewhat like a
reference when a person is applying for a job). The agents giving references are called the
referees. Here, references are in the form of ratings given by b’s partners about its perfor-
mance in (past) interactions between them. These ratings allow b to prove its (achievable)
9 It is assumed that some form of security mechanism (such as a public-key infrastructure) is employed to
ensurethattheprovidedreferencescannotbetamperedwith.Forinstance,allreferencescouldbeaccompanied
by digital signatures from the issuers using their private keys [41]. By so doing, any change to a reference will
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performance as viewed by its previous interaction partners and then to gain the trust of its
potentialpartners.However,sinceb canchoosewhichratingstoputforward,arationalagent
willonlypresentitsbestones.Therefore,itshouldbeassumedthatCRinformationprobably
overestimates anagent’s expectedbehaviour.Thus,althoughit cannotguaranteeb’s minimal
performance in future interactions, the CR information does reveal a partial perspective on
agent b’s capabilities (which is certainly useful for trust evaluation in the absence of other
sources of information).
Though CR may have lower predictive power than the other types of trust (where all bad
and good ratings can be collected), it is useful because of its wide applicability. With the
cooperation of its partners, agent b can obtain their references from just a small number of
interactions.10 From our evaluation, for instance, in a society where 100 agents provide a
service to 500 others, agents using direct experience to evaluate trust require more than 100
interactions to achieve a reasonable level of utility gain, which is still less than that achieved
by agents using CR after ﬁve interactions (see Section 5.2 for more detail). In addition to
its high availability, since references are stored by the target agent and provided directly to
the evaluator, CR has a very low running cost (i.e. time, communication, processing cost)
compared to sources like witness reputation. Since CR information comes from the target
agent, the CR component complements the other components of FIRE, which use informa-
tion collected by the evaluator, reducing the chances that they may fail to calculate trust due
to lack of input (see Section 3.1). Thus, incorporating the CR component makes FIRE able
to provide a trust value in most circumstances.
In more detail, the process of CR is as follows:
– After every transaction, agent b asks its partners to provide their certiﬁed ratings about
its performance from which it can choose the best ratings to store in its (local) rating
database.
– When agent a contacts b to express its interest in using b’s service, it asks b to provide
references about its past performance with respect to an interested term c.
– Agent a receives the set of certiﬁed ratings of b from b, which we call RC(a,b,c) (C to
denote this set is obtained via the CR mechanism), and calculates the CR of b based on
this set.
In this process, since agent b relies on its interaction partners’ cooperation to get references,
agents may refuse to give out their ratings (as in the case of witness reputation). However,
this is a much smaller problem than that in witness reputation because this information is
requestedfarlessfrequently(eachrefereeisrequestedtogiveitsratingonlyonce).Moreover,
giving such information could be made a standard part of any agreement for task allocation
and so agents could be forced to give it. The most notable point in this process is that when
agent a makes the trust evaluation, it only involves agents a and b. Since the certiﬁed ratings
about b are stored by b itself, they are immediately available to a as in the case when a
uses its own experience. It should also be noted that when a referee provides references to
an interaction partner, it surrenders its privacy with respect to how it values that partner’s
performance. This may lead to various possible reactions of that partner (e.g. it may retaliate
against the referee for a bad reference, it may treat the referee differently the next time to get
a better reference). However, due to the vast number of possibilities in the reactions of both
10 In many scenarios, such as those in the Internet, established service providers (e.g. news service, online
merchants) usually have high volumes of interactions (at any time). Therefore, if they adopt the CR process
outlined here, we can reasonably expect that such providers will have an abundance of performance ratings
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agents (i.e. the referee and the referred agent), we do not consider the effects of giving up
privacy in CR here and defer it to future work.
Having obtained the references of b, a can calculate the CR value of b using the formula
in (1). However, since there is no guarantee about the honesty of agents in an open MAS, we
needmeasurestoprevent,ortominimisetheadverseeffectsof,lying(e.g.collusionbetween
the target agent and its referees in producing falsely inﬂated references). Here, we use the
ratingweightfunctionωC(ri)toreﬂectthecredibilityofareference(i.e.rating).Again,since
we are not considering the problem of lying in this paper, the rating weight function for CR
is deﬁned based only on the recency of ratings as per Section 3.3 (i.e. ωC(ri) = ωI(ri)).
The value of CR, TC(a,b,c), and its reliability, ρC(a,b,c), are calculated as deﬁned in
Section 3.2.
3.7. An overall value
When using FIRE to evaluate trust, an agent can decide which components it will use for
trust evaluation according to its needs and situation. However, as each component produces
trust values from a separate source of information, we believe that combining the four com-
ponents, and effectively the four information sources, will in most cases yield a higher level
of precision (as conﬁrmed by the empirical evaluation in Section 5.2). Thus, we recommend
combining all the aforementioned trust values into a single composite measure to give an
overall picture of an agent’s likely performance. As all trust values in FIRE come with reli-
ability values, instead of averaging the trust values from the four components, we again use
the weighted mean method to calculate the composite trust value, denoted by T (a,b,c),t o
take each trust value’s reliability into account:
T (a,b,c) =

K∈{I,R,W,C} wK · TK(a,b,c)

K∈{I,R,W,C} wK
(6)
where wK = WK · ρK(a,b,c),a n dWI, WR, WW, WC are the coefﬁcients corresponding to
the IT, RT, WR, and CR components. These coefﬁcients are set by end users to reﬂect the
importance of each component in a particular application. The reliability of the composite
trust value, denoted by ρT (a,b,c), is calculated from the components’ reliability values in
a similar manner:
ρT (a,b,c) =

K∈{I,R,W,C} wK

K∈{I,R,W,C} WK
(7)
4. Experimental setup and methodology
In order to empirically evaluate FIRE, we designed a testbed that simulates the relationships
and interactions between agents in which trust models are used for selecting interaction
partners (Section 4.1). The testbed’s environment characterises that of an open MAS. The
methodology used for FIRE’s evaluation is described in Section 4.2.
4.1. The testbed
The testbed environment for evaluating FIRE is a multi-agent system consisting of agents
providing services (calledproviders) andagents using thoseservices (called consumers). We
assume that the performance of a provider (and effectively its trustworthiness) in a particular
service it provides (e.g. news services) is generally independent from that in another serviceAuton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 13: 119–154 137
Fig. 4 The spherical world and an example referral chain fromconsumerC1 (throughC2 andC3) to provider
P via acquaintances
(e.g.weatherservicesorbankingservices).Therefore,withoutlossofgenerality,andinorder
toreducethecomplexityofthetestbed’senvironment,itisassumedthatthereisonlyonetype
ofserviceinthetestbed.Hence,alltheprovideragentsofferthesameservice.However,their
performance (i.e. the quality of the service) differs and determines the utility that a consumer
gains from each interaction (called UG). The agents are situated randomly on a spherical
world whose radius is 1.0 (see Fig. 4). Each agent has a radius of operation (ro—depicted
by a dotted circle around an agent in Fig. 4) that models the agent’s capability in interacting
withothers(e.g.theavailablebandwidthortheagent’sinfrastructure)andanyagentssituated
in that range are the agent’s acquaintances. In the case of a provider, its radius of operation
serves as the normal operational range in which it can provide its service at its full capability
without loss of quality. For consumers outside that provider’s normal operational range, the
quality of service they receive from it gradually degrades. This simulates the phenomenon
that each agent usually has particular circumstances (here its location) which affect service
delivery. For example, two distant agents may experience signiﬁcant network latency during
their interactions, or a seller agent in the UK may charge another agent extra for shipping
goods abroad and the goods may arrive much later than usual.
Simulations are run in the testbed in rounds (of agent interactions). Events that take place
in the same round are considered simultaneous. The round number is used as the time value
for events. In each round, if a consumer agent needs to use the service it can contact the
environment to locate nearby provider agents11 (in terms of the distance between the agents
on the spherical world). The consumer agent will then select one provider from the list to use
its service. The selection process relies on the agent’s trust model to decide which provider
is likely to be the most reliable. Consumer agents without a trust model randomly select a
provider from the list. On the other hand, an agent with a trust model selects a provider as
follows:
11 Thisistosimulateasituationinwhichonlyaportionoftheproviderpopulationisavailabletoagivenagent.
For example, a retail banking agent can only serve customers in its country. In addition, as the degradation
of service quality is proportional to the distance between a provider and its consumer, providers that are too
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1. It evaluates the trustworthiness of all the providers in the list. Providers whose trust-
worthiness cannot be determined (due to no available rating) are placed in the set
NoTrustValue. The rest, whose trustworthiness has been determined, are placed in the
set HasTrustValue.
2. There can be up to two options available to the agent:
(a1) select the provider with the highest trust value in the set HasTrustValue,w h i c h
according to the trust model is likely to yield the highest UG;a n d
(a2) select a random provider from the set NoTrustValue, allowing it to learn about the
performance of an unknown provider (i.e. exploring the provider population).
3. Obviously, if the set HasTrustValue is empty, it can only choose (a2); if the set NoTrust-
Value is empty, it can only chose (a1).
4. Otherwise, it needs to determine which action it should take. Choosing (a2) allows it
to explore more about the provider population although it may risk losing utility if it
encounters a bad provider. In contrast, choosing (a1) is likely to give a more predictable
value for the expected UG. However, it may not be the optimal performance the agent
can get because it has not learnt enough about the provider population. This exploit-vs-
explore dilemma is addressed in this work by using the Boltzmann exploration strategy
[18]. Using this strategy, an agent tends to explore its environment ﬁrst and then grad-
ually move its stance towards exploitation when it learns more about the environment.
Thus, the agent chooses an action ak with the probability of
P(ak) =
e
ER(ak)
T

ai e
ER(ai)
T
(8)
where ER(ai)istheexpectedreturnfromchoosingactionai,T isthetemperatureparam-
eter which is set to decrease over time to decrease exploration. In brief, the probability
that an action ak is selected is biased by the expected return of that action. Moreover,
when an agent’s level of exploration is decreased (by decreasing T over time) the action
with the highest expected return will be more likely to be selected (i.e. the agent is more
likely to exploit the knowledge it has learnt about the performance of provider agents).
Here, the expected return for (a1) is the expected UG of the highest trusted provider
as calculated from its trust value, and that for (a2) is the average UG of the provider
population that has been observed by the consumer agent.
Having selected a provider, the consumer agent then uses the service of the selected pro-
vider and gains some utility from the interaction (UG). The value of UG is in [−10,10] and
depends on the level of performance of the provider in that interaction. A provider agent
can serve many users at a time. As in realistic situations, a consumer agent, however, does
not always use the service in every round. The probability it needs and requests the service,
called its activity level and denoted by α, is selected randomly when the consumer is created.
Inotherwords,theactivitylevelofaconsumerdetermineshowfrequentlyitusestheservice.
After an interaction, the consumer agent rates the service of the provider based on the
level of performance, or the quality of the service, it received. It records the rating for future
trust evaluations and also informs the provider about the rating it made. The provider may
record the rating as evidence about its performance to be presented to potential consumers.
As we have previously discussed, it is assumed that all agents exchange their information
honestly in this testbed. This means an agent (as a witness or as a referee) provides its true
ratings as they are without any modiﬁcation.
In our testbed the only difference in each situation is the performance of the provider
agents. We consider four types of provider agents: good, ordinary, bad, and intermittent.Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 13: 119–154 139
Each of them, except the last, has a mean level of performance, denoted by µP. Its actual
performance follows a normal distribution around this mean. The values of µP and the asso-
ciated standard deviation of these types of providers, denoted by σP, are given in Table 2.
Intermittent providers, on the other hand, yield unpredictable (random) performance levels
in the range [PL_BAD,PL_GOOD]. In addition, if a consumer agent is situated outside of
the provider’s normal operational range (i.e. ro) the service quality of that provider is also
degraded linearly in proportion to the distance between the provider and the consumer.
Since agents can freely join and leave an open MAS, the agent population can be very
dynamic. Moreover, since agents are owned and controlled by various stakeholders, the per-
formance of an agent may not be consistent over time (i.e. its performance may change
according to its own situation). Therefore, in order to simulate such dynamism, we introduce
the following factors in our testbed:
– The population of agents: In an open MAS, agents can come and leave the system at
anytime. This is simulated by removing a number of randomly selected agents from the
testbedandaddingnewonesintoit.Thenumbersofagentsaddedandremovedaftereach
round vary, but have an upper limit of some predeﬁned percentage of the whole popu-
lation. The population change limits for the consumer and the provider populations are
denoted, respectively, by pCPC and pPPC. Since providers are usually more established
thanconsumers, pPPC issettobelowerthan pCPC inoursimulations.Thecharacteristics
of the newly added agents are set randomly but they are uniformly distributed over the
initial agent populations (i.e. the proportions of providers of different proﬁles and that of
consumers in different groups are maintained).
– The locations of agents: During their life cycle, agents break old relationships and make
new ones (reﬂecting the notion of continual change that is inherent in open MAS). In
our testbed, this type of change is reﬂected by the change in an agent’s location on the
spherical world. When a consumer changes its location, it will have a new set of acquain-
tances according to its ro. In addition, the location of an agent in the testbed also reﬂects
its individual situation covering things such as its knowledge about other local agents
(see Section 3.5) and the service delivery between providers and consumers (see above).
Therefore, changing an agent’s location changes its relationships with others, as well
as its individual situation. Speciﬁcally, we use polar coordinations (r,ϕ,θ)for agent
locations on the spherical world. Then in order to change an agent’s location, amounts
of angular changes  ϕ and  θ are added to ϕ and θ, respectively. In this case,  ϕ and
Table 1 Performance level
constants
Performance level Utility gained
PL_PERFECT 10
PL_GOOD 5
PL_OK 0
PL_BAD −5
PL_WORST −10
Table 2 Proﬁles of provider
agents (performance constants
deﬁned in Table 1)
Proﬁle Range of µP σP
Good [PL_GOOD,PL_PERFECT] 1.0
Ordinary [PL_OK,PL_GOOD] 2.0
Bad [PL_WORST,PL_OK] 2.0140 Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 13: 119–154
 θ are selected randomly in [− φ,+ φ]. Thus,  φ limits the variability of agents’
locations. Not every agent changes its locations every round and, in particular, pCLC and
pPLC are used to denote the probabilities that a given consumer or provider, respectively,
changes its location in a round.
– The behaviour of the providers: In many environments, provider performance may alter
(for better or worse) over time. A provider may even change its behaviour completely
(e.g.aprovidermaytakeadvantageofitsgoodreputationanddecidetoperformselﬁshly
to obtain better utility). In our testbed, the average performance of a provider (µ) can be
changed by an amount of  µ randomly selected in [−M,+M], and this happens in each
round with the probability of pµC. Moreover, after each round, a provider can switch to
a completely new provider proﬁle with a probability of pProﬁleSwitch.
Thechangesabovetothetestbed’senvironment(ifineffect)areappliedonlyaftereachround
ofinteractionsﬁnishes.Thenatureanddegreeofdynamismarespeciﬁedineachexperiment.
4.2. Experimental methodology
In each experiment, the testbed is populated with provider and consumer agents. Each con-
sumer agent is equipped with a particular trust model, which helps it select a provider when
it needs to use a service. Since the only difference among consumer agents is the trust
models that they use, the utility gained by each agent through simulations will reﬂect the
performance of its trust model in selecting reliable providers for interactions. Therefore, the
testbed records the UG (Section 4.1) of each interaction along with the trust model used. In
order to obtain an accurate result for performance comparisons between trust models, each
one will be employed by a large number of consumer agents (NC). In addition, the average
UG of agents employing the same trust models (called consumer groups) are compared with
each other’s using the two-sample t-test (for means comparison) [6] with the conﬁdence
level of 95%12. The result of an experiment is then presented in a graph with two y-axes;
the ﬁrst plots the UG means of consumer groups in each interaction and the second plots the
corresponding performance rankings obtained from the UG means comparisons using the
t-test. The plot for the performance ranking of a group is also denoted by the group’s name
but preﬁxed by ‘R.’ Here, we specify that the group of a higher rank outperforms the one of a
lowerrankandgroupsofequalrankhaveinsigniﬁcantlydifferentperformance.Forexample,
in Fig. 5, at the 5th interaction (on the x-axis), agents in group FIRE obtain an average UG
of 5.06 (reading on the left y-axis) and, according to the t-test ranking, the rank of FIRE (as
shown by the plot R.FIRE) is 3 (reading on the right y-axis).
The experimental variables are presented in Table 3 and their values will be used in all
cases unless otherwise speciﬁed. Although a “typical” provider population may differ in
various applications, the space of possibilities is vast and exploring it completely would be
impossible. Therefore, we choose provider populations which we believe are more common
than others for our experiments. Here, we consider a typical provider population to consist
of about half proﬁtable providers (i.e. yielding positive UG) and half exploiting providers
(i.e.yieldingnegativeUG,includingintermittentproviders).However,goodandintermittent
12 In analysing (experimental) data about two populations, say their income levels, the fact that the means
of the two sample groups’ incomes is different does not always mean that the two populations have different
levels ofincome if randomnesscan affect sampleselection. Itis possible thatthemeans ofthese two particular
samples are different, but the means of the two populations’ incomes are not. Thus the t-test is a statistical
method that allows us to conﬁrm within a predeﬁned conﬁdence level whether the difference of the two means
actually means one group has higher income than the other, eliminating the random factor in selecting the
samples (see [6] for more detail).Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 13: 119–154 141
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Fig. 5 Overall performance of FIRE in the typical provider population
Table 3 Experimental variables Simulation variable Symbol Value
Number of simulation rounds N 500
Total number of provider agents: NP 100
+ Good providers NPG 10
+ Ordinary providers NPO 40
+ Intermittent providers NPI 5
+ Bad providers NPB 45
Number of consumer agents in each group NC 500
Range of consumer activity level α [0.25,1.00]
providers are usually exceptional cases and, thus, they take only a small portion of each half.
Except in the experiments where we evaluate FIRE with different provider populations, this
typical provider population is used throughout.
Here, we also show the default parameters of FIRE for the experiments in Table 4. The
component coefﬁcients are set to reﬂect our view on the reliability of the information source
used by each component. The IT component deduces trust from ratings in which the agent
does the rating itself and, thus, is more reliable than the WR and CR components, which
use information from third-parties.13 We expect the CR information to exaggerate an agent’s
true performance, hence, the CR component has the lowest reliability. The RT component
provides rules encoding knowledge and beliefs about the agent’s environment to customise
the trust model, so it should also have a high reliability. Given the time unit used in the test
bed(roundofinteractions),wesettheITrecencyscalingfactorsuchthata5-roundoldrating
has half (0.5) the effect of a new rating (1.0).
5. Empirical evaluation
Having presented the testbed and the methodology for FIRE’s evaluation, we now turn to
the experiments themselves. In particular, we concentrate on the beneﬁt of using FIRE for
13 Becausethesituationofeachagentcandifferfromthatofanother,differentagentscanhavedifferentobser-
vations about the performance of a particular provider. For example, in our testbed, from the same provider,
the quality of the service a consumer receives depends on the distance between it and the provider. Therefore,
because of such differences, even when witnesses are honest (as is assumed in this paper), their reports are
not always as useful as an agent’s own observations.142 Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 13: 119–154
Table 4 FIRE’s default
parameters
Parameters Symbol Value
Local rating history size H 10
IT recency scaling factor λ −(5/ln(0.5))
Branching factor nBF 2
Referral length threshold nRL 5
Component coefﬁcients
+Interaction trust WI 2.0
+Role-base trust WR 2.0
+Witness reputation WW 1.0
+Certiﬁed reputation WC 0.5
Reliability function parameters
+Interaction trust γI −ln(0.5)
+Role-base trust γR −ln(0.5)
+Witness reputation γW −ln(0.5)
+Certiﬁed reputation γC −ln(0.5)
selecting interaction partners with different provider populations (Section 5.1) and the con-
tributing values of its individual components (Section 5.2). We also explore the impact of
various dynamic factors on the performance of FIRE (Section 5.3).
5.1. Overall performance of FIRE
In order to evaluate the overall performance of FIRE, we compare it with the SPORAS
model14 (whose operation is described in Section 2.2) and a group of agents with no trust
model. Hence, there are three groups of consumer agents: FIRE, SPORAS,a n dNoTrust.
The ﬁrst thing to test is whether FIRE helps consumer agents select proﬁtable providers (i.e.
those yielding positive UG) from the population and, by so doing, helps them gain better
utility than without FIRE (i.e. the NoTrust group). In this section, the testbed’s environment
is static, which means that no dynamic factors are in effect.
Here, Fig. 5 shows that the NoTrust group, selecting providers randomly without any
trust evaluation, performs consistently the lowest (as we would expect). On the other hand,
both SPORAS and FIRE prove to be beneﬁcial to consumer agents, helping them to obtain
signiﬁcantly higher UG. This shows that the tested trust models can learn about the provider
population, and allow their agents to select proﬁtable providers for interactions. However,
t h ec h a r t ,a sw e l la st h et-test ranking, also shows that FIRE outperforms SPORAS,t h e
second rank, throughout the interactions by about 2 UG units. This is despite the fact that
SPORAS, being a centralised model, gathers much more information than FIRE (a decen-
tralised model).15 The performance difference of FIRE and SPORAS is accounted for by
the fact that FIRE separates direct experiences from others’ experiences (i.e. ratings) in trust
14 SPORAS is chosen as the control benchmark for two reasons. First, it is a successful independently devel-
oped trust model that several other researchers have used for benchmarking (e.g. [4], [27]). Second, other
than SPORAS, most other notable trust models make assumptions that are incompatible with open MAS, or
require additional knowledge, and, thus, they will not operate as intended in our testbed.
15 After every interaction, the consumer reports its rating about the provider’s service in that interaction to
SPORAS. Therefore, as a centralised service, SPORAS collects all the available ratings from its users. In
contrast, consumers employing FIRE have only ratings from a limited set of witnesses (from the WR compo-
nent) and those presented by providers (from the CR component) in addition to their own ratings. Typically
in our experiments, after the ﬁrst 10 rounds the average number of ratings taken into account in each trust
evaluation request to FIRE is 3.28, and that to SPORAS is 15.55. After 20 rounds the corresponding numbersAuton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 13: 119–154 143
Table 5 The performance of SPORAS and FIRE in the ﬁrst 10 interactions
Interaction: 1 2 3 4 5 67891 0
SPORAS 0.20 0.85 1.80 2.96 3.53 3.42 3.42 3.52 3.58 3.62
FIRE −0.16 1.20 2.30 4.00 5.06 5.44 5.66 5.52 5.47 5.53
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Fig. 6 Overall performance of FIRE—100% good providers
evaluation, while SPORAS treats all types of ratings equally. Therefore, SPORAS suffers
from noise in ratings (resulting from different degrees of degradation of service quality due
to different provider-consumer distances). In contrast, FIRE reduces rating noise by giving
more weight to direct experiences (see Table 4), which are more relevant to an individual
agent’s situation. Another noticeable point is that in the ﬁrst few interactions, FIRE can learn
about the providers quicker than SPORAS as the FIRE group achieves its superiority from
the ﬁrst interaction (see Table 5) despite much less information being available to it. As we
showinSection 5.2,thisisachievedthankstotheWRand,inparticular,theCRcomponents.
We reran the same experiment but with provider populations consisting of providers
of only one proﬁle (e.g. good, ordinary, bad, and intermittent) to see how different types
of providers may affect FIRE’s performance. Speciﬁcally, the experiment is run with 100
good providers, then with 100 ordinary providers, 100 bad providers, and 100 intermittent
providers. The result in the case of intermittent providers is not shown here because the
performance of all three groups is indistinguishable; ﬂuctuating randomly in [−1,0] (this
is expected because of the random behaviour of intermittent providers). In the rest of the
experiments, we observe similar results (see Figs. 6–8) to that in our ﬁrst experiment with
the typical provider population. FIRE maintains its superiority in all the three types of pro-
vider population (good, ordinary, and bad). This suggests that FIRE can work well in a wide
range of provider population.
In sum, through the experiments on FIRE’s overall performance, we conﬁrm that FIRE
is beneﬁcial to agents in selecting interaction partners in the various provider populations.
In addition, despite being decentralised and having less information than SPORAS, FIRE
outperforms the model in all the cases thanks to its differential treatment of each source of
trust information.
are 4.05 and 28.47, respectively. This suggests that FIRE may be advantageous in environments in which
rating information costs some premium.144 Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 13: 119–154
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Fig. 7 Overall performance of FIRE—100% ordinary providers
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Fig. 8 Overall performance of FIRE—100% bad providers
5.2. Performance of FIRE’s components
We argued that each component of FIRE plays an important role in exploiting trust informa-
tion from a particular source and this, in turn, contributes to the effectiveness of the overall
model. In order to conﬁrm this, we benchmark FIRE with and without various components
to evaluate the contribution of that component to the whole model. However, since the IT
component is mostly reused from Regret, we will only focus on evaluating the novel compo-
nents (i.e. WR and CR). Role-based trust is not considered here because it is typically highly
domain speciﬁc. Experiments in this section evaluate the WR and CR components with the
typical provider population in a static environment.
First, we benchmark the WR component. In this experiment, there are two groups of con-
sumer agents. The ﬁrst one uses only the IT component16 (called the Control group). The
16 ItshouldbenotedthatifRegretisemployedinourtestbed,itsperformancewillbesimilartothatofFIRE’s
IT component only. This is due to the fact that there is no information about a social network of the agents
in the testbed available for Regret. Therefore, other than the direct trust component, the other components of
Regret will not be able to work due to a lack of supporting information (e.g. its witness reputation component
cannot locate witnesses, and the neighbourhood reputation component cannot locate neighbouring agents of
the target agent).Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 13: 119–154 145
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Fig. 9 Performance of the WR component
second makes use of the WR component in addition to the IT component (called the WR
group). This experiment’s hypothesis is that the performance of the WR should be higher
than that of the Control group.
The result of the experiment, presented in Fig. 9, shows that the WR component substan-
tially improves the performance of agents in the WR group compared to that of those in the
Controlgroup.Thet-testrankingconﬁrmsthisbyshowingthatagentsusingtheWRcompo-
nent outperform agents using only the IT component in all interactions, and, effectively, also
veriﬁes our hypothesis. More importantly, the WR group achieves its higher performance
quicker than the Control group. This means that WR speeds up an agent’s learning about its
environmentbypropagatingtrustintheagent’scommunity(herethecommunityofconsumer
agents is connected to one another via acquaintances).
In the next experiment we evaluate the CR component (using a similar setting). Here,
there are two groups of consumer agents. The Control group employs the IT component,
and the other employs the CR component in addition (called the CR group). The hypothesis
in this experiment is that the CR group should outperform the Control group. The result
presented in Fig. 10 shows a similar result to that of the previous experiment. Hence, all of
the claims made above for the WR component are still valid for the CR component. How-
ever, the most noticeable thing about this experiment is its execution time. Without having
to look for witnesses as in the process of WR, the process of CR is more direct, resulting in
an execution time for this experiment being about 15 times faster than that of the previous
one.ThisconﬁrmsourintuitionaboutthehighserviceabilityoftheCRcomponent.Asubtler
point shown in this experiment is the quick learning time of the CR group. Comparing the
ﬁrstinteractionsoftheWRgroupinFig.9withthoseoftheCRgroup,Fig.10showsthatthe
CR group starts off better than the WR group right from the ﬁrst few interactions. In order to
verify this observation, eliminating the random factor that may affect the results of the two
independent experiments above, we ran another experiment to compare the performance of
FIRE with and without the CR component. In this experiment, there are also two groups of
consumer agents: the WR group employing the IT and WR components and the FIRE group
employing the IT, WR, and CR component. Our hypothesis is that the addition of the CR
componenttoFIREisbeneﬁcial,or,equivalently,theFIREgroupshouldoutperformtheWR
group.TheresultinFig.11showsthattheperformanceofFIREisindeedalwayshigherthan
that of the WR group. In more detail, presented in Table 6, the FIRE group’s performance146 Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 13: 119–154
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Fig. 10 Performance of the CR component
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Fig. 11 Performance of FIRE with and without the CR component
Table 6 The performance of WR and FIRE in the ﬁrst 10 interactions
Interaction: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
WR −0.50 −0.39 −0.35 0.01 0.40 0.99 1.36 1.80 2.10 2.57
CR 0.71 2.08 2.94 4.38 5.02 5.34 5.67 5.92 5.99 5.89
reaches its stable level of around 6.0 in only eight interactions, while that of the WR group
only reaches 2.57 after 10 interactions. This shows that the CR process propagates trust in
an agent community more quickly than the WR process. Taking into consideration its very
quick execution time, compared to that of the WR component in the previous experiments,
the CR component is clearly useful in situations where an agent needs to have a quick trust
evaluation in order to expedite decisions, or when WR information is scarce and difﬁcult
to locate. We conclude that the addition of the CR component to FIRE is beneﬁcial both in
terms of its robustness (reﬂected by its higher level of performance) and its serviceability.Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 13: 119–154 147
Insummary,ithasbeenshownthattakingvarioussourcesoftrustinformationintoaccount
not only helps FIRE be able to make trust evaluations in a wide variety of situations, but also
increases its precision; and that all the components contribute a signiﬁcant amount to its
overall performance.
5.3. The effects of dynamism
TheenvironmentofarealisticopenMASisalwayschangingbecauseofitsopenness.Hence,
a trust model designed for open MAS should be able to function properly in such a dynamic
environment. This section concentrates on testing the hypothesis that FIRE still maintains
its properties (i.e. being beneﬁcial to agents in selecting interaction partners) in a changing
environment. Similarly to the experiments in Section 5.1, there are three groups of consumer
agents in the experiments: NoTrust, SPORAS,a n dFIRE. The provider population is the
typical one. Each experiment will test the hypothesis with only one dynamic factor in effect
(seeSection4.1).Speciﬁcally,thesameexperimentswillberunbutwitheachofthefollowing
conditions:17
1. The provider population changes at maximum 2% every round (pPPC = 2%).
2. The consumer population changes at maximum 5% every round (pCPC = 5%).
3. A provider may alter its average level of performance at maximum 1.0 UG unit with a
probability of 0.10 each round (pµC = 0.10, M = 1.0).
4. A provider may switch into a different (performance) proﬁle with a probability of 2 each
round (pProﬁleSwitch = 0.02).
5. A provider may move to a new location on the spherical world at a maximum angular
distance of π
20 with a probability of 0.10 each round (pPLC = 0.10,  φ = π
20).
6. A consumer may move to a new location on the spherical world at a maximum angular
distance of π
20 with a probability of 0.10 each round (pCLC = 0.10,  φ = π
20).
These experiments are named Experiment 1–6, respectively and their results are shown in
Figs. 12–17. Since the NoTrust group still has the lowest performance, we omit its results
from the charts for the sake of simplicity. A general observation from all the results is that
both FIRE and SPORAS still maintain positive UG from about 3.0–6.0 (except SPORAS
in Experiment 4, Fig. 15). However, dynamism, as it introduces noise to the environments,
adverselyaffectstheperformanceofbothoftheminalltheexperimentsreportedhere.Speciﬁ-
cally, and as we would expect, their performance is lower than that in the static environment
(Fig. 5) and the performance plots also evolve differently over time. Nevertheless, although
having lower levels of performance than in a static environment, the shape of FIRE’s per-
formance plots are generally maintained after they reach their stable level in the ﬁrst few
interactions in all the experiments. This shows that FIRE is able to maintain a stable perfor-
mance regardless of the various types of changes in the environment. In other words, FIRE
can learn about the changes and adapt quickly to them.
In more detail, the experiments here can be put into two categories: dynamism on the
consumer side (Experiments 2 and 6), and dynamism on the provider side (Experiments 1,
3–5). In the ﬁrst group, the results (Figs. 13 and 17) show that SPORAS can cope well with
thesetypesofchanges.ThisisbecauseSPORAScollectsratingscentrallyfromallconsumers
and, thus, small changes on the consumer side do not have a signiﬁcant impact on its per-
formance as its learned knowledge about the provider population is still useful. Particularly
in Experiment 2, where new consumers are added to the testbed, newly joined agents using
17 These are what we consider to be reasonable values of variation. We have conducted similar experiments
with both greater and lesser degrees of dynamism and we see the same broad trends as we report here.148 Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 13: 119–154
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Fig. 12 Experiment 1: Provider population change: pPPC = 2%
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Fig. 13 Experiment 2: Consumer population change: pCPC = 5%
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Fig. 14 Experiment 3: Providers change their performance: pµC = 10%, M = 1.0Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 13: 119–154 149
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Fig. 15 Experiment 4: Providers switch their proﬁles: pProﬁleSwitch = 2%
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Fig. 16 Experiment 5: Providers change their locations: pPLC = 10%,  φ = π/20
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Fig. 17 Experiment 6: Consumers change their locations: pCLC = 10%,  φ = π/20150 Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 13: 119–154
SPORAS take advantage of the existing knowledge of the centralised model and perform
highly right from the start. In contrast, FIRE relies on the consumer community for witness
reputation and, thus, has a slightly lower performance than that in the static environment.
Nevertheless, it still outperforms SPORAS in Experiments 2 and 6.
The situation is different in the experiments of the second category. SPORAS’s perfor-
manceissigniﬁcantlyaffectedwhenproviderschangetheirperformancelevels(Experiments
3and4,whoseresultsareshowninFigs.14and15),mostnoticeablyinExperiment4,where
providers switch their performance proﬁles completely. In this experiment, although FIRE
is also affected greatly by the steep changes in the provider population, it still maintains a
generally high and stable performance, while SPORAS’s performance degrades dispropor-
tionatelytothatoftheNoTrust group.Itshouldbenotedthatthetrustmodels’dutyhereisto
learn and predict the behaviour (i.e. the performance) of providers and, therefore, their per-
formanceinanenvironmentwheretherearechangesontheprovidersidereﬂectstheirability
to adapt to such changes. Hence, the results suggest that SPORAS can quickly learn about
the environment (because of its centralised nature) but has difﬁculty adapting to the contin-
ual changes of the providers. In Experiments 1 and 5 (Figs. 12 and 16), where the provider
population changes and where the providers move around, respectively, the performance of
FIREandSPORASseemtobeonlyslightlyaffected.Ingeneral,FIREperformsconsistently
in all these experiments. Its average UG is stable around 6.0 in Experiments 1, 3, and 5; and
around 4.0 in Experiment 4 (which has most abrupt changes). This conﬁrms our intuition
that the recency function of FIRE helps it adapt quickly to changes in the environment.
Since a realistic open MAS usually has a combination of all the dynamic factors consid-
ered here, we also want to test how FIRE performs in such situations. Therefore, we ran an
additional experiment with all the dynamic factors active at the same time. The result, in
Fig. 18, shows that although both FIRE and SPORAS suffer from the continual changes
of various types in the testbed’s environment, FIRE manages to maintain a rather stable
performance in the range [4.0,5.0]. SPORAS, however, cannot cope with all the types of
changes at the same time and its performance degrades dramatically and is at the same level
as that of the NoTrust group through all interactions. This again conﬁrms the adaptability of
FIRE in a complex dynamic environment.
Insummary,theexperimentsinthissectionshowthatFIREisabletoperformconsistently
in various dynamic environments, maintaining a high level of utility gain for its agents (in
all the experiments).
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6. Conclusions and future work
This paper has presented FIRE, a novel decentralised model for trust evaluation that is spe-
ciﬁcally designed for general applications in open MAS. By so doing, we also introduce a
generic framework which allows a variety of sources of trust information to be integrated to
provide a collective and precise trust measure (i.e. able to predict closely the behaviour of an
agent). These sources include: direct experiences of an agent from its interactions, witness
reports, third-party references, and rules provided by end users encoding beliefs or knowl-
edge about the environment. In particular, we introduce a novel type of reputation based on
third-partyreferencescalledCertiﬁedReputation.Theadditionofthisnewtypeofreputation
greatlyenhancestheserviceabilityofourtrustmodel,allowingatrustmeasuretobeavailable
in most circumstances. Moreover, our proposed framework can easily be customised via its
various parameters to suit a particular application domain. In short, we believe FIRE can
provide a trust measure that is sufﬁciently precise to be used in a wide range of situations
and applications in open MAS.18
In more detail, through empirical evaluation, we have shown that:
– Agents using the trust measure provided by FIRE are able to select reliable partners for
interactionsand,thus,obtainbetterutilitygaincomparedtothoseusingnotrustmeasure.
This result was reconﬁrmed with various types of provider population.
– Each component of FIRE plays an important role in its operation and signiﬁcantly con-
tributes to its overall performance.
– FIRE is able to cope well with the various types of changes in an open MAS and can
maintain its properties despite the dynamism possible in an environment.
– Althoughdecentralised,tosuittherequirementsofatrustmodelinopenMAS,FIREstill
outperforms or maintains a comparable performance level with SPORAS, a centralised
trust model.
In sum, FIRE satisﬁes the ﬁrst two requirements for a trust model in open MAS as speciﬁed
in Section 1. However, at present, FIRE assumes the agents report their trust information
truthfully. As noted in the requirements, this is not suitable for our target domain. As the
WR and CR components are based on third-party reports, they are susceptible to false or
inaccurate information, whose existence is unavoidable in open MAS. For this reason, we
plan to devise reliability measures for witness ratings and certiﬁed ratings (i.e. ωW(ri) and
ωC(ri)) that determine and take into account the credibility of third-party information. These
will allow the general trust formula in (1) to weight ratings by their credibility and to ﬁlter
outthosethatdeemtobecompletelyinaccurate.ThiswillmakeFIRErobustagainststrategic
disinformation behaviours in reporting trust information as well as inherent inaccuracy. In
addition, as noted in Section 3.6, giving references in our CR component also means giving
up an agent’s privacy of how it values others’ services and the effects of this can be very
complex. Therefore, we plan to investigate this problem thoroughly in order to avoid unde-
sirable effects on the performance of CR. After having been able to deal with such obstacles,
FIRE will be ready to be used in real open MAS applications.
18 Obviously, there are still cases when FIRE cannot produce a trust value. Speciﬁcally, those are when a
service provider newly joins the system. Hence, it does not have references about its performance and other
agents do not have past experience with it. However, in a realistic scenario, in order to promote its service, that
provider can join a (popular) scheme/organisation that provides quality assurance about its members’ service.
For example, a car dealer can obtain the title “authorised dealer” from a car manufacturer. Such (popular)
membership (and inherently its quality assurance) can be recognised by other agents (via rules in FIRE’s RT
component) and thus helps the provider to sell its service.152 Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 13: 119–154
In terms of improving FIRE’s overall performance, we also plan to incorporate learning
abilities. At present, FIRE is a static parametric model (i.e. all of its parameters need to be
set by users in order to suit a particular application domain). This is clearly limiting and
so we aim to study which of FIRE’s parameters can be adjusted dynamically to adapt it to
changes in an agent environment. For instance, if the number of lying agents in its envi-
ronment increases, an agent may reduce the component coefﬁcient of witness and certiﬁed
reputation (WW and WC, see Section 3.7); or if its environment changes too quickly (e.g.
the agents alter their behaviours frequently), it can reduce the local rating history size H to
discard older (and likely out-of-date) ratings.
Appendix A
A Regret’s direct trust
In Regret’s direct trust component, each agent rates its partner’s performance after every
interaction and records its ratings in a local database. The relevant ratings will be queried
from this database when trust evaluation is needed. In order to calculate the direct trust of
agent b, agent a retrieves its past ratings about b’s performance. The set of ratings is called
R19. Then the direct trust of a to b, denoted by DTa→b, is calculated as follows:
DTa→b =

ri∈R
ρ(t,ti) · ri (A.1)
where ri is a rating value in the set R,a n dρ(t,ti) is a normalised weight value that gives
higher values to ratings of more recent interactions:
ρ(t,ti) =
f (ti,t)

ri∈R f (ti,t)
(A.2)
f (ti,t) =
ti
t
(A.3)
where t is the current time and ti is the time the rating ri is recorded. However, this weight
function has some shortcomings on time granularity control. Actually, after being factored,
(A.2) is equivalent to:
ρ(t,ti) =
ti 
ri∈R ti
(A.4)
Therefore, the weight function depends only on the time values of a particular set of ratings,
rather than the recency of those ratings in comparison with the current time t.F o re x a m -
ple, assume that r1 and r2 are ratings about the interactions that took place at time t1 = 1
and t2 = 2, respectively, and that R = {r1,r2}. Equation A.4 will give ρ(t,t1) = 1/3a n d
ρ(t,t2) = 2/3. Hence the difference of the weights for r1 and r2 is 1/3 in the interaction
trust calculation. Suppose that r 
1 and r 
2 are completely the same ratings to r1 and r2 except
that t 
1 = 100 and t 
2 = 101. The same calculations will give a weight difference that is now
1/10100. This vast change in weight differences is not desirable given that the rating time
difference in both cases is the same (1 time unit, e.g. a second). Moreover, given the same
19 Due to the limited scope of this paper, Regret and its notation are simpliﬁed here. However, the main ideas
of the model are still retained.Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 13: 119–154 153
set of ratings, the weight function produces the same value regardless of the current time t20
(i.e. the time of calculating the interaction trust).
Every trust value in Regret comes with a reliability value that reﬂects the conﬁdence of
Regret in that trust value. This reliability value is calculated from a combination of two mea-
sures that are based on the number of ratings in the set R and the deviation of those ratings.
Regretdeﬁnesanintimatelevelofinteractions,denotedbyitm,thatrepresentstheminimum
number of ratings needed for a close relationship. The reliability degree increases until |R|
reaches this number. After that, more interactions will not increase reliability. The measures
(Nofor number of ratings and Dv for deviation of ratings) and the reliability for direct trust,
denoted by DTRLa→b are speciﬁed in the following formula:
No(R) =

sin

|R|·π
2·itm

|R|≤itm
1 |R| > itm
(A.5)
Dv(R) =

ri∈R
ρ(t,ti) ·| ri − DTa→b| (A.6)
DTRLa→b = No(R) · (1 − Dv(R)) (A.7)
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